

Message Text

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ACTION H-01

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P R 230900Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4677
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3452

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, US, JO, XF, OREP (BAKER, HOWARD)

SUBJ: CODEL BAKER: TALKS WITH KING, CROWN PRINCE AND PRIME MINISTER

1. SENATOR HOWARD BAKER, ACCOMPANIED BY STAFF MEMBERS TILLMAN AND BRANSON SPENT A BUSY AND SUCCESSFUL 24 HOURS IN JORDAN MAY 21-22.

THIS TELEGRAM REPORTS MAJOR ITEMS OF INTEREST IN THEIR MEETINGS WITH ABOVE AND WAS NOT REVIEWED BY SENATOR PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE AND IS THEREFORE SUBJECT TO HIS COMMENT AND CORRECTION.

2. CODEL MET CROWN PRINCE HASAN SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVAL MORNING MAY 21. BASIC FOCUS OF DISCUSSION WAS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, ALTHOUGH

CROWN PRINCE WAS INTERESTED IN MOOD IN ISRAEL AND IN DISCUSSING SOME OF THE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE AREA. CROWN PRINCE NOTED HE HAD JUST COME FROM SHOWING IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER FITZGERALD THE COUNTRY AND THAT ONE OF MAJOR TOPICS WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE RAISED AT

EX/ARAB DIALOGUE WOULD BE UNRWA DEFICIT PROBLEM. HERE HE INDICATED THAT OVER THE YEARS NUMEROUS PALESTINIANS HAD QUIETLY INTEGRATED THEMSELVES ECONOMICALLY IN JORDAN AND THAT THIS WAS FACT WITH POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. NEVERTHELESS HE NOTED HE WAS FULLY CONSCIOUS
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OF FACT THAT SUCH STEPS HAD REAL POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. WHILE HE

HOPED THAT THE ECONOMIC IN THE LONG RUN COULD OVERCOME SOME OF THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS, THAT DID NOT SEEM TO BE THE CASE NOW AND JORDAN HAD TO BE MOST CAREFUL. UNRWA DEFICIT ISSUE WOULD RAISE QUESTION AGAIN OF WHAT TO DO ABOUT TAKING CARE OF REFUGEES AND WHILE ARABS (PLO) DID NOT WANT PALESTINIANS TO BE INTEGRATED IN ANY WAY IN JORDAN, IF JORDAN WAS FORCED TO TAKE OVER ISSUE THAT MIGHT HAPPEN. (CROWN PRINCE HAS TRADITIONALLY FELT THAT GOJ SHOULD THROUGH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TRY TO DEFUSE PALESTINIAN ISSUE BY INTEGRATING REFUGEES INTO THE ECONOMY. CONVERSATION WAS NOTABLE BECAUSE IT PAID GREATER ATTENTION TO POLITICAL FACTORS ON HIS PART THAN WE HAVE SEEN BEFORE).

2. SENATOR NOTED THAT ISRAELIS PROFESSED TO BE EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT HAWK MISSILES IN JORDAN. CROWN PRINCE LAUGHED AND SAID HE DID NOT YET THINK JORDAN HAD WORKED OUT WHERE THEY WERE GOING TO GET ALL THE TRAINED MANPOWER TO OPERATE THEM - - IMPLYING THAT IT WOULD COME OUT OF THE HIDE OF GOJ DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS. CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO A DESCRIPTION OF VARIOUS FACETS OF JORDAN'S FIVE YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND THE DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL OF THE COUNTRY. SENATOR BAKER ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS AND INDICATED TO THE CROWN PRINCE, DURING DISCUSSION OF JORDAN'S FERTILIZER POTENTIAL, THAT TVA RAN AN NATIONAL FERTILIZER CENTER WHICH WAS DOING SOME VERY ADVANCED WORK. IT WOULD PERHAPS BE IN JORDAN'S INTEREST TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH AND TAP INTO THOSE ACTIVITIES. CROWN PRINCE INDICATED AN INTEREST.

3. ALSO DURING THE CONVERSATION ON DEVELOPMENT, SENATOR EXPLAINED THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD VAST RESERVES OF NATURAL GAS WHICH WAS CURRENTLY BEING BLARED. WHILE THERE WERE AMBITIOUS PLANS FOR THE USE OF THIS GAS, IT SEEMED WITH 4 BILLION CUBIC FEET PER ANNUM, THERE WOULD STILL BE PLENTY LEFT TO HELP JORDAN IN THE PRODUCTION OF POWER, FERTILIZER AND PERHAPS FOR EVENTUAL DESALINIZATION NEEDS. HASAN ALSO APPEARED TO BE VERY INTERESTED IN THIS SUGGESTION AND AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT TRANSPORT BY THE PRESENTLY UNDERUTILIZED TAPLINE MIGHT BE A POSSIBILITY.

4. WITH PRIME MINISTER RIFAI THE CONVERSATION CENTERED ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACE IN THE REGION. PRIME MINISTER NOTED JORDAN INTERESTED IN MOOD AND SITUATION IN ISRAEL, HE ASKED ABOUT ALL THE CURRENT FUSS ABOUT JORDAN ARMS. CONFIDENTIAL

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SENATOR MENTIONED THAT HAWK WAS CREATING A STIR. RIFAI RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT WEAPON IS PURELY DEFENSIVE AND THAT JORDAN AT PRESENT TIME IS DEFENSELESS. IF ISRAEL HAS NO DESIGNS ON JORDAN IT SHOULD NOT WORRY ABOUT HAWK. THE SENATOR MENTIONED THAT HE HAD HEARD NOTES OF FLEXIBILITY FROM RABIN AND OTHERS IN ISRAEL ALTHOUGH WHEN HE HAD PRESSED ABOUT WHERE THE FLEXIBILITY MIGHT BE ON THE GOLAN, THE LINE SEEMED TO BEGIN CREEPING CLOSE TO DAMASCUS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD VERY STRONG FEELINGS

ABOUT THE GOLAN. RIFAI RESPONDED THAT THE ARABS DID TOO. THEY BELIEVED ISRAEL HAD TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY WHICH THEY HAD TAKEN. IN ANY WAR, NOW THAT SYRIANS HAD THE 300 MILE SCUD AND WERE HOPING TO OBTAIN A 600 MILE MISSILE SHORTLY, IF YOU CARRIED THE GOLAN THESIS ABOUT NOT BEING UNDER SYRIAN GUNS TO ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE OVER THE FIRST 300 MILES OF SYRIA.

5. RIFAI WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT NOW ARAB MOOD HAD CHANGED AND WAS PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL AND OFFER IT PEACE IN RETURN FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORY TAKEN IN 1967. KING HAD SPOKEN OUT IN THE US ON THIS POINT THIS YEAR. WHILE HE HAD SAID SAME THING IN PAST YEARS, THIS YEAR FOR THE FIRST TIME HE HAD SPOKEN SIMILARLY ON BEHALF OF EGYPT AND SYRIA WHICH HAD PUBLICLY SUPPORTED HIS STATEMENT.

6. RIFAI MENTIONED THE SECDEF STATEMENT ON THE OIL EMBARGO WHEN THE TALK TURNED TO WHAT MIGHT BE AHEAD IN THE AREA FOR THE FUTURE. SENATOR MADE CLEAR THAT THE ARABS SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE DEEPLY AFFECTED BY AN OIL EMBARGO IN THE FUTURE, NOR SHOULD THEY LIGHTLY IMPOSE ONE. THE US COULD SURVIVE AN EMBARGO, BUT WESTERN EUROPE WOULD PROBABLY COLLAPSE. RIFAI SAID THAT JORDAN'S POSITION HAD ALWAYS BEEN THAT THE EMBARGO WAS THE WORST THING THAT THE ARABS COULD DO; IT HAD BEEN THEIR VIEW IN 1973 AND WAS NOW. HOWEVER, JORDAN HAS NO OIL AND CANNOT INFLUENCE THE ARAB VIEW. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION RIFAI SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE ARABS WANTED TO OR WOULD IMPOSE AN EMBARGO RIGHT AWAY IN THE EVENT OF WAR. BUT IT COULD AND PROBABLY WOULD COME OVER TIME, IF THE ISSUES ARE NOT SETTLED THROUGH NEGOTIAION AND IT WOULD BE A CALAMITY FOR THE WORLD.

7. ASKED WHAT JORDAN THOUGHT SHOULD BE DONE NEXT, RIFAI SAID THAT JORDAN STILL PREFERRED PROCEEDING WITH A NEXT STEP ON THE SINAI.
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HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE UNITED STATES COULD HAVE DELIVERED ISRAEL DURING THE LAST NEGOTIATION AND THAT HE FELT WE HAD TO CHANGE OUR AID POLICY TO ISRAEL IF NECESSARY TO INDUCE INCREASED FLEXIBILITY IN THE ISRAELI POSITION. FOR YEARS WE HAD SAID THAT WITH THE SECURITY OF AID FROM -THE US, ISRAEL WOULD BE FLEXIBLE ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT MORE AID SEEMED TO ADD TO INTRANSIGENCEANCE. HE HOPED THE US WOULD TRY ANOTHER APPROACH. HE REPEATED JORDANIAN CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE AT GENEVA.

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ACTION H-01

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----- 039813

P R 230900Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4678

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

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8. BRIEFLY TOUCHING ON THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT, RIFAI NOTED THAT THE SHOOTING CONTINUED AND RECOMMENDED AGAINST A VISIT AT THIS TIME. TURNING TO THE LONG RANGE PROSPECTS FOR LEBANON, RIFAI SAID THAT HE THOUGHT LEBANESE WERE BEGINNING TO THINK ABOUT SOME LONG RANGE CHANGES IN THE INFORMAL POLITICAL SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT WITH A MOSLEM MAJORITY INCLUDING THE PALESTINIANS, THEY MIGHT SELECT A MOSLEM AS PRESIDENT.

9. SENATOR SAW KING LATER THAT AFTERNOON. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM ISRAEL AND SEEN THE GOLAN FROM THE OTHER SIDE. HE CONVEYED THE RESPECTS AND REGARDS OF CHAIRMAN SPARKMAN AND SENATOR CASE TO THE KING. SENATOR TOLD KING HE HAS HERE IN AN EFFORT TO LEARN AND ASKED KING FOR HIS VIEWS. KING SAID HE HAD JUST FINISHED A VISIT WITH SADAT AND HIS PRIME MINISTER HAD JUST TALKED WITH ASAD. SADAT IS MOST ANXIOUS ABOUT WHAT THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO DO NEXT. THE KING IS DEEPLY AFRAID THAT IF THE QUESTION OF PEACE IS NOT MOVED FORWARD THE MODERATES IN THE AREA AND PRE-EMINENTLY PRESIDENT SADAT MIGHT NOT BE AROUND FOR TOO MUCH LONGER. MILITARILY ISRAEL HAS THE UPPER HAND. JORDAN WAS DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A CONFLICT AND AN OIL EMBARGO. THERE WERE ALSO PRESSURES ON THE UNITED STATES TO OVERREACT IN THE AREA IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL AS A RESULT OF EVENTS IN
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SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE SENATOR AGAIN STRESSED THE SERIOUSNESS OF

AN OIL EMBARGO, NOTED HE WOULD BE SPENDING THREE DAYS IN SAUDI ARABIA TO LOOK INTO THE SITUATION AND TOLD THE KING THAT THE US CONTINUED TO LOOK TO HIM AS A FORCE FOR MODERATION AND STABILITY.

10. KING ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT JORDAN'S RECENT MILITARY EQUIPMENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US WERE RELATED TO PURELY DEFENSIVE ITEMS, "WE ARE REALLY EXPOSED, AND WE BELIEVE WE ARE A PRIMARY TARGET". ON THE FLANK OF SYRIA WE CANNOT BE SURE THE ISRAELIS WILL NOT MAKE USE OF OUR TERRITORY IN THE EVENT OF A WAR.

11. THE SENATOR SAID HE HAD SEEN SOME EVIDENCE OF ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY. THE KING LAMENTED THAT IT WAS ALMOST TOO LATE. THE ISRAELIS HAD MISSED A NUMBER OF OPPORTUNITIES AND DID NOT SEEM TO REALIZE THIS UNTIL AFTERWARD. THEY HAD TO GET OUT OF THE FORTRESS CONCEPT. TERRITORY OR PEACE WAS THE VITAL ISSUE. HE SAID IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION THAT JERUSALEM SHOULD BE OPEN TO ALL, UNDER A GOVERNMENT WHICH ALLOWED FREE CIRCULATION, BUT WITH THE ARAB PORTION RETURNED TO ARAB SOVEREIGNTY, IT IS THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE BUT EVEN A JOINT CIVIL ADMINISTRATION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE DIVIDED, THERE SHOULD BE EQUAL RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO ALL PARTS OF THE CITY.

12. THE SENATOR BRIEFLY REVIEWED FOR THE KING HIS TALKS WITH THE CROWN PRINCE AND POSSIBLE USE OF SAUDI FLARE GAS IN JORDAN IN THE FUTURE. THE KING NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN DEEPLY WORRIED BY THE ASSASSINATION AND THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA. HOWEVER DURING HIS VISIT HE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION OF MORE STABILITY AND A MORE PROGRESSIVE APPROACH.
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